

ORIG : RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.  
UNIT : SA/DCI/PC  
EXT : 707-8  
DATE : 24 JUNE 1954

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : LINCOLN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SA/PC/DCI (1)

INFO : DCI (2), D/DCI (3), DD/P (L) (4), WH (5), WH (PBS) (6-8)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

[ ] 06396 (OUT 57047)

2330Z 24 JUN 54

PRIORITY  
PRECEDENCE

CITE: DIR

TO: SLINC

REF: A. LINCOLN 4161 (IN 20591)  
B. LINCOLN 4164 (IN 20595)  
C. DIRECTOR 05857 (OUT 56010)

1. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH ODACID ON PLANS FOR CONSOLIDATION PHASE TO DETERMINE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PRPRIME WOULD RECOGNIZE A REBEL GOVERNMENT OR WOULD OFFER MILITARY OR ECONOMIC AID TO A NEW REGIME. NO AUTHORITATIVE CONCLUSIONS YET REACHED AND NONE LIKELY TO BE UNTIL THERE IS FIRMER INDICATION REVOLT SUFFICIENTLY SUCCESSFUL AT LEAST PRODUCE SITUATION IN WHICH REBELS CONTROL CONSIDERABLE TERRITORY AND SUFFICIENT FORCES TO GIVE THEM AT LEAST AN EVEN CHANCE OF OVERTHROWING REGIME. IN VIEW FLUID AND PRELIMINARY NATURE ODACID VIEWS BELIEVE NO USEFUL GUIDANCE CAN BE GIVEN YOU AND UNDERSTAND NO PRESENT ODACID PLANS FOR COMMUNICATING ON THIS MATTER WITH JMBLUG OR STILLET.

2. AS TO IMMEDIATE DECISIONS, GENERALLY CONCUR YOUR INSTRUCTIONS REF A ON QUESTION DESIRABILITY ESTABLISHMENT NEW REGIME AND ANNOUNCEMENT NAMES OF GOVERNMENT MEMBERS, BELIEVE MUST WEIGH TWO OPPOSING CONSIDERATIONS:

A. EARLY ACTION DESIRABLE IN ORDER INCREASE AIR OF LEGITIMACY OF REBELLION AND MAKE SEMI-OFFICIAL SUPPORT POSSIBLE SOONER IF MOVEMENT SUCCESSFUL.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

RELEASING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER  
Copy No. 8

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B. MAIN DANGER THIS ACTION THAT IT WILL ALIENATE ARMY OFFICERS WHO  
EITHER DISLIKE CALLIGERIS OR SIMPLY PREFER THEMSELVES CONTROL NEW REGIME.

3. ON BALANCE WE CONCLUDE UNWISE ANNOUNCE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT NOW FOR  
REASON GIVEN REF A PAR 1A AND BECAUSE EFFECT OF SUCH ACTION ON ARMY UNEVALUATED.  
MEANWHILE IF TRAFFIC CAN STAND IT SUGGEST MESSAGE TO BANNISTER, PAGE, AND JMBLUG  
INQUIRING IF THEY BELIEVE ESTABLISHMENT PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT NOW WOULD REDUCE  
CHANCES OF ACTION AGAINST AREENZ BY ARMY OFFICERS.

4. REGARDLESS ACTION BY CALLIGERIS BELIEVE DESIRABLE IF CONTACT RE-ESTABLISHED  
[ ] BY PAGE OR BANNISTER TO POINT OUT THAT IF ARMY MOVES DECISIVELY AGAINST  
AREENZ IT RATHER THAN CALLIGERIS WILL RULE THE COUNTRY AND TO STATE THAT SKIDDER  
WOULD SUPPORT REGIME ESTABLISHED BY ARMY EVEN IF IT EXCLUDED CALLIGERIS ENTIRELY.  
WELL AWARE DANGER PLAYING BOTH GROUPS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND NATURALLY WOULD GREATLY  
PREFER OUTCOME IN WHICH [ ] AND CALLIGERIS COMBINED FORCES. NEVERTHELESS IF  
SIZEABLE PART OF THE ARMY WILL REALLY MOVE IT WILL BE A STRONGER FORCE THAN ANYTHING  
CALLIGERIS HAS, EXCEPT AIR POWER WHICH WE COULD CONTROL IN A PINCH. LINE HERE  
PROPOSED WAS SUGGESTED LAST SENTENCE PAR 5 REF C.

5. IF YOU AGREE PARA 4 ABOVE YOU MAY WISH SEND APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS  
WSBURNT. END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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